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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 In nearly all circumstances, we require police officers 
to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before 
engaging in a search or seizure of a person, their house, their 
papers, or their effects.  One of the few exceptions to this rule 
allows police to conduct a warrantless search or seizure when 
exigent circumstances require them to act with such alacrity 
that requiring them to first obtain a warrant would be 
unreasonable.  The question at the heart of this case requires 
us to determine whether an exigency has abated such that 
officers are no longer excused from the warrant requirement.  
I. 
A. 
 In the late evening and early morning hours of January 
14 and 15, 2012, Kamaal Mallory and his stepbrother Ismail 
Abu Bakr were at the home of Delaine Abu Bakr, Ismail’s 
mother and Mallory’s stepmother, who resided at 3434 Old 
York Road in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  At the time, both 
Mallory and Ismail
1
 were employed as emergency medical 
technicians for the Northwest Care Ambulance Company.  
                                              
1
 Because several of the individuals in this case share 
the same last name, we will refer to them, when necessary, by 
their first name. 
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Mallory did not live with Delaine full-time, but he and his 
two daughters often stayed with her on weekends, and 
planned to do so on the weekend of January 13th through the 
15th. 
 Between about 1:45 and 2:30 a.m. on the 15th, 
Mallory and Ismail were standing with friends in front of a 
neighbor’s home.  Officer Eric Enders approached them in a 
police cruiser, shined a spotlight on them, and ordered them 
to disperse.  Although they complied with this order, Ismail 
cursed at Officer Enders, telling him to stop shining the 
spotlight in his face.  Officer Enders and his partner then 
detained Ismail for disorderly conduct, placing him in the 
backseat of the cruiser, and driving around the corner.  
 Meanwhile, Mallory returned to his stepmother’s 
house where his stepsister, Siddiqah Abu Bakr, let him in.  
Siddiqah had observed through a window the situation 
unfolding outside, and awoke her mother to tell her what was 
happening.  After Siddiqah returned to the window, she saw 
Ismail being placed into the cruiser, which had left by the 
time Delaine came downstairs.  Officer Enders detained 
Ismail for a few minutes before removing his handcuffs and 
releasing him.  Ismail walked back toward his mother’s 
house, seeing two police cruisers out front. 
 At 2:33 a.m., Officers Richard Hough and William 
Lynch, Jr., received a dispatch advising them that there was a 
group of men outside on the 3400 block of Old York Road, 
and that one of them was armed with a gun.  The allegedly 
armed man was a black male wearing a brown leather jacket 
over a black hooded sweatshirt.  The officers arrived at 3434 
Old York Road about five minutes after receiving the 
dispatch. 
 Delaine, who by this time was standing outside on her 
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porch, approached the driver’s side door of the second cruiser 
to speak with Officers Hough and Lynch.  She asked them 
whether they had arrested Ismail.  While they were speaking, 
Officer Hough noticed a man standing nearby who matched 
the description of the suspect.  This man was later identified 
as Mallory.  The District Court observed that it remains 
unclear precisely where Mallory was standing in relation to 
Delaine, but it is undisputed that Mallory was outside and in 
view of the officers. 
 At one point, Mallory spoke with Officers Hough and 
Lynch, and as he did so his jacket lifted to reveal a revolver 
stuck in his waistband.  When Officer Hough observed this, 
he exclaimed “gun!” in order to alert his partner to the 
presence of a weapon.  Officer Hough exited the vehicle and 
ordered Mallory to stop, but Mallory instead ran into 
Delaine’s house, shutting the door behind him. 
 The officers gave chase.  Siddiqah, who had come 
outside, briefly blocked the officers’ entry, shouting that they 
had no right to enter without a warrant. They pushed her aside 
and Officer Hough kicked the door, breaking the latch.  
Someone inside blocked the door from opening, and Officer 
Hough kicked the door several times, breaking loose a lower 
panel on the door.
2
  The person holding the door shut relented 
and Officer Hough opened the door, which, when one faced it 
from outside, swung in and to the left. 
 It was dark inside the house.  The officers entered with 
                                              
2
 At the suppression hearing, Officer Hough claimed 
that he had seen Mallory hide the gun under some umbrellas 
through the hole in the door.  The District Court rejected his 
claim as lacking credibility, and the Government does not 
challenge that factual finding on appeal. 
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weapons drawn, followed inside by Siddiqah and Delaine.  
Siddiqah was distraught, and the officers told them both to 
exit the house.  It was then that another of Mallory’s 
stepsisters, Tazkeyah Abu Bakr, came down the stairs.  One 
of the officers pointed his weapon at her and told her to leave 
the house, and Tazkeyah joined Delaine and Siddiqah on the 
front porch. 
 While Officer Hough was kicking in the door, Officer 
Lynch had called for backup.  When Officers Kevin Gorman 
and Kevin Robinson arrived shortly thereafter, Officers 
Hough and Lynch had already entered the house and were 
awaiting them in the first floor living room.  Officer Hough 
ordered Officers Gorman and Robinson to stay on the first 
floor, with instructions to prevent the family from reentering 
the house.  Officers Hough and Lynch then began searching 
the four-story home for Mallory, beginning on the top floor 
and working their way down.  They searched for Mallory in 
places where a person could hide, such as rooms and closets. 
They also searched for the firearm in places where a firearm 
could be hidden, like inside drawers and under pillows.  
During the search, Ismail returned and briefly argued with 
one of the officers before Delaine persuaded him to join the 
rest of the family on the front porch. 
 During the search of the house, supervising Officer 
Sergeant Marc Hayes arrived.
3
  He spoke with Delaine, who 
explained that the family had been instructed to wait on the 
porch while the officers searched the house, but that it was 
cold outside.  Sergeant Hayes allowed the family to wait in 
the living room, but when Officer Hough came back 
                                              
3
 The District Court concluded that although it was 
unclear precisely how many officers were at the home, there 
were at least five. 
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downstairs and saw this he explained to the Sergeant that he 
did not want the family in the house until the officers had 
recovered the firearm.  The family was sent back outside. 
 The officers eventually located a locked bathroom on 
the first floor, which they had at first overlooked because they 
thought it was an exterior door.  Believing that Mallory was 
hiding in the bathroom, the officers asked Delaine if she had a 
key, which she did not.  No response came from within the 
bathroom when Delaine asked Mallory to come out.  The 
officers used a crowbar to pry open the door, finding Mallory 
inside.  They arrested and handcuffed him, and began to 
escort him through the first floor to the front door. 
 As the officers proceeded with Mallory from the rear 
of the house to the front door, one of them asked whether the 
area behind the opened front door had been searched.
4
  
Officer Hough then recovered a revolver from “under or 
behind umbrellas located on the left side of the foyer behind 
the front door, which had been swung open into the house.”  
United States v. Mallory, No. 12-379, 2013 WL 943407, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
B. 
 Mallory was indicted in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on one count of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  He moved to suppress the 
gun.  The District Court held a suppression hearing and heard 
                                              
4
 There is some dispute about what precisely the 
officer said.  Ismail testified at the suppression hearing that he 
heard an officer ask whether the area had been searched; 
Siddiqah and Tazkeyah testified that they heard one officer 
say “check behind the door.”   
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testimony from one witness for the Government – Officer 
Hough – and five witnesses for the defense – Ismail, Delaine, 
Siddiqah, Tazkeyah, and Richard Thomas, III, a friend of 
Mallory’s.   
 The District Court granted the motion to suppress.  It 
held first that Mallory had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in Delaine’s home because, although he did not reside there, 
he and his daughters spent weekends there and were staying 
there the night of his arrest.  Accordingly, he had standing to 
challenge the legality of the search.  Mallory, 2013 WL 
943407, at *6.  The Government does not challenge this 
holding on appeal.   
 On the merits, the District Court concluded that the 
officers had probable cause to believe that Mallory had 
committed the crime of carrying a firearm “upon the public 
streets” of Philadelphia, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 6108, and that their warrantless entrance into the 
home was justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine 
because they were in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing Mallory.  
Mallory, 2013 WL 943407, at *6-7.  This exigency allowed 
the officers not only to enter the home and search for 
Mallory, but also to search places too small for a person to 
hide in order to recover the firearm.  Id. at *7-8.  However, 
once the police had found and secured Mallory, the exigency 
justifying their warrantless search – hot pursuit of an armed 
suspect – no longer existed.  The District Court disagreed 
with the Government that Officer Hough’s search was 
justified to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, 
another of the recognized exigencies that may render a 
warrantless search reasonable.  Because exigent 
circumstances no longer existed, the District Court concluded, 
Officer Hough’s warrantless search behind the door to 
 9 
recover the gun was illegal and suppression was required.
5
 
 The District Court’s order granting suppression was 
signed on March 11, 2013, and was entered on the docket on 
March 12, 2013.  The Government filed a notice of appeal on 
April 10, 2013, which stated that it was appealing “the order 
of [the District Court] entered on March 11, 2013.”  SA at 1.  
The Government failed to certify that the appeal was “not 
taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence [suppressed] 
is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding,” as 
required under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  Realizing its mistake, the 
Government filed an amended notice of appeal the next day 
that included the required certification. 
II. 
 Before we proceed to the merits, we must resolve 
disputes over both our jurisdiction and the appropriate 
standard of review.  
A. 
 Mallory argues that we lack jurisdiction over this 
appeal because the Government failed to timely comply with 
the certification requirement of § 3731.  His argument 
proceeds in three steps: first, that compliance with § 3731 is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite; second, that the thirty-day window 
within which the Government must file its appeal under 
§ 3731 also applies to the certification requirement; and third, 
that the time limit begins on the date that the suppression 
order was “rendered,” not the date that it was entered on the 
docket, which in this case would mean that the Government 
missed the deadline by a single day. 
                                              
5
 The District Court also rejected the Government’s 
inevitable discovery argument, which the Government does 
not press here. 
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 Section 3731 grants this Court appellate jurisdiction 
over Government appeals from certain adverse rulings in a 
criminal case.  Of relevance here, § 3731 states: 
An appeal by the United States 
shall lie to a court of appeals from 
a decision or order of a district 
court suppressing or excluding 
evidence . . . if the United States 
attorney certifies to the district 
court that the appeal is not taken 
for purpose of delay and that the 
evidence is a substantial proof of 
a fact material in the proceeding. 
18 U.S.C. § 3731.  The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
require that the Government, when entitled to appeal in a 
criminal case, must file notice of its appeal within thirty days 
after “the entry of the . . . order being appealed,” Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added), and an “order is entered for 
purposes of this Rule 4(b) when it is entered on the criminal 
docket,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6).  Section 3731, on the other 
hand, states that “[t]he appeal . . . shall be taken within thirty 
days after the decision, judgment or order has been rendered . 
. . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3731 (emphasis added).  Mallory claims 
that the difference in language is important: a decision is 
“rendered” when it is announced, either orally or in writing, 
by the judge; it is “entered” when it is recorded on the docket.  
Mallory Br. at 27-28 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 531, 
1296 (6th ed. 1990)).  In his view, then, the clock began 
ticking when the District Court’s suppression order was 
signed on March 11, and the Government’s amended notice 
of appeal (which included the certification) was filed one day 
late, on April 11.  The Government disputes this, arguing that 
the thirty-day period began when the order was entered on the 
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docket on March 12, meaning that its amended filing was 
timely. 
 We conclude that the Government’s amended notice of 
appeal, filed on April 11, was timely under both Rule 
4(b)(1)(B) and § 3731.  In United States v. Midstate 
Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161 (1939), the Supreme Court 
interpreted the language of a predecessor to § 3731.  That 
statute’s filing deadline for Government appeals was in haec 
verba with § 3731’s filing deadline, requiring that “[t]he 
appeal . . . shall be taken within thirty days after the decision 
or judgment has been rendered . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 682 (1934 
ed.) (emphasis added).  In Midstate, the district court had 
“filed” the opinion from which the Government appealed on 
June 16, 1938, but had not “entered” the order until July 2, 
1938.  306 U.S. at 163 n.2.  The Government filed its appeal 
on July 20, 1938, which was eighteen days after entry of the 
final order but more than thirty days after the opinion was 
filed.  Id.  The defendant sought to dismiss the appeal for 
failure to comply with the deadline, but the Court summarily 
dismissed this argument, concluding that “[t]he appeals were 
from the judgments and orders of July 2, and not the previous 
written opinion.”  Id. 
 Midstate establishes that the limitations period of § 
3731 began to run on the date that the District Court’s order 
was entered on the docket, and under that calculus the 
Government’s certification was timely.  We are not persuaded 
that Congress intended that there be a different operative date 
for appeal deadlines between Rule 4 and § 3731, 
notwithstanding the slight difference in language.  See In re 
Hurley Mercantile Co., 56 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1932) 
(observing that “in the scheme of federal appeals we believe 
the statutes have used the terms ‘rendition’ and ‘entry’ 
interchangeably rather than with technical accuracy”).  The 
 12 
certification requirement ensures “‘a conscientious pre-appeal 
analysis by the responsible prosecuting official.’”  United 
States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
United States v. Carrillo-Bernal, 58 F.3d 1490, 1494 (10th 
Cir. 1995)).  That purpose is not served by artificially 
restricting the time that the Government has to determine 
whether it should appeal.
6
  Because we conclude that the 
Government’s certification was timely, it is unnecessary for 
us to decide whether the 30-day limitations period applies to 
the certification requirement, or whether that requirement is 
                                              
6
 If we adopted Mallory’s argument, that could lead to 
results entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the statute.  In 
this case, one day separated the District Court’s signing of the 
order from its entry on the docket.  But it is certainly 
imaginable that administrative delays may, occasionally, lead 
to a longer gap between a judge signing an order and it being 
entered on the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case 
Files (“CM/ECF”) system.  To see the problem with 
Mallory’s position, one need only consider the following 
hypothetical.  Suppose that a judge signed an order granting a 
motion to suppress on the first day of the month, but for some 
reason the clerk did not enter it onto CM/ECF until the 29th 
of the month.  Under Mallory’s rubric, the Government would 
have only a single day to determine whether it should file its 
appeal.  This would hardly serve § 3731’s purpose of 
encouraging the Government to carefully consider whether it 
should exercise its appellate rights. 
 13 
jurisdictional.
7
   
B. 
 We review the District Court’s order granting a motion 
to suppress for clear error with respect to the underlying 
factual findings, “but we exercise plenary review over legal 
determinations.”  United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 
(3d Cir. 2012).  The parties disagree, however, on how that 
standard applies in this case.  The Government claims to have 
no quarrel with the District Court’s factual findings and 
asserts that it is challenging only the legal conclusion that the 
exclusionary rule applies.  It urges us to review this decision 
de novo.  Mallory, however, reads the Government’s appeal 
as a challenge to the factual finding that any exigency 
                                              
7
 Mallory contends that we have already determined 
that the certification requirement is jurisdictional.  See United 
States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(observing that “[w]e . . . have appellate jurisdiction . . . so 
long as” the Government files the § 3731 certification); 
United States v. Kepner, 843 F.2d 755, 761 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(generally referring to each of the requirements under § 3731 
as “jurisdictional prerequisites”); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting our 
jurisdiction in light of the Government’s compliance with the 
certification requirement).  We do not reach the merits of the 
jurisdictional question and, therefore, express no opinion on 
it.  But we are skeptical that these decisions settled the matter, 
as timely compliance with the certification requirement was 
not a contested issue in any of them.  See Arbaugh v. Y&H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (cautioning against reliance 
on “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” applying “less than 
meticulous” analysis of jurisdictional questions (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).    
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justifying warrantless entry into the home dissipated after 
Mallory was taken into custody, a conclusion that he contends 
we should review for clear error.  Mallory’s argument rests on 
United States v. Coles, in which we stated that “[t]he presence 
of exigent circumstances is a finding of fact, which we review 
for clear error.”  437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
Government asserts that this statement is unsupported dictum 
that is not binding on this panel. 
 Although a precedential opinion of this Court can be 
overruled only by the Court sitting en banc or the Supreme 
Court, it is “well established that a subsequent panel is not 
bound by dictum in an earlier opinion.”  Mariana v. Fisher, 
338 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 3d Cir. IOP 9.1 and 
Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Emps. of Allegheny Health 
Educ. and Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 375-76 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  We have defined dictum as “a statement in a judicial 
opinion that could have been deleted without seriously 
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding – that, 
being peripheral, may not have received the full and careful 
consideration of the court that uttered it.”  In re McDonald, 
205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 
F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986)).   
 The statement in Coles is dictum because the existence 
of an exigency was not a contested issue in that case, a fact 
that becomes apparent when the statement is read in context: 
The presence of exigent 
circumstances is a finding of fact, 
which we review for clear error.  
The District Court found that 
exigent circumstances – the 
possibility of evidence being 
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destroyed – existed after the 
officers knocked on the hotel 
room door and demanded entry.  
Coles does not challenge that 
finding on appeal.  He asks us to 
review only . . . whether the 
police improperly created the 
exigency.  Our attention is thus 
focused upon this second prong 
for the remainder of our 
discussion. 
 
437 F.3d at 366 (first emphasis in original) (citation and 
footnote omitted).  The Court then considered whether the 
police had created the exigency upon which they relied to 
justify their warrantless entry into a hotel room, taking as 
established that an exigency existed.  Id. at 370.  The 
statement regarding the standard of review served no part in 
the analysis and thus could be “deleted without seriously 
impairing” the Court’s reasoning.  McDonald, 205 F.3d at 
612.  Accordingly, we conclude that the statement in Coles is 
nonbinding dictum and that we must determine in the first 
instance whether a District Court’s finding on the presence or 
absence of exigent circumstances is subject to clear error or 
de novo review. 
 Which standard of review is appropriate in a given 
circumstance depends on which judicial actor – the trial judge 
or the appellate panel – has a comparative advantage in 
resolving the issue at hand.  In United States v. Brown, we 
adopted a “functional analysis” for determining the 
appropriate standard of review for mixed questions of law and 
fact, an analysis that reflects the relative institutional 
competencies of district courts and courts of appeals.  631 
 16 
F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2011).  When there is a need “to 
control and clarify the development of legal principles” 
through the “collective judgment” of appellate courts, de 
novo review is appropriate.  Id. at 643 (citing Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)).  On the other hand, 
trial judges are better positioned to assess such questions as 
“witness credibility and juror bias” because these matters turn 
on “evaluations of demeanor,” and therefore we overturn such 
findings only if they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  We explained 
the dichotomy further: 
If application of the rule of law to 
the facts requires an inquiry that is 
“essentially factual” — one that is 
founded “on the application of the 
fact-finding tribunal’s experience 
with the mainsprings of human 
conduct” — the concerns of 
judicial administration will favor 
the district court, and the district 
court’s determination should be 
classified as one of fact 
reviewable under the clearly 
erroneous standard. If, on the 
other hand, the question requires 
us to consider legal concepts in 
the mix of fact and law and to 
exercise judgment about the 
values that animate legal 
principles, then the concerns of 
judicial administration will favor 
the appellate court, and the 
question should be classified as 
one of law and reviewed de novo. 
 17 
Id. (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by 
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), as recognized in 
Deegan v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 167 F.3d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 
1999)).   
 When a district court makes factual findings 
supporting a conclusion that exigent circumstances existed, it 
makes the type of credibility determinations that district 
courts are best suited to make, and accordingly we will defer 
to them unless they are clearly erroneous.  But whether the 
historical facts of a warrantless search or seizure meet the 
legal test of exigency is the type of question that involves the 
careful consideration of legal precepts and the values that 
underlie them, questions that favor de novo review.  It is “a 
cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 
580 (1991)).  Nowhere is this more true than in the home, the 
threshold of which may only be crossed without a warrant or 
consent when exigent circumstances exist.  See Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); id. at 585 (“[T]he physical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording 
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 
U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (“As Payton makes plain, police 
officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent 
circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home.”).  
De novo appellate review of district court decisions regarding 
the existence of exigent circumstances is appropriate to 
carefully police the boundaries of this exception and to ensure 
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that it does not erode the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 We conclude that, on appeal from a decision involving 
the presence or absence of exigent circumstances justifying a 
warrantless search or seizure, this Court will review the 
district court’s findings of fact for clear error, but will review 
its conclusion that those facts establish a legal exigency de 
novo.  This decision is consistent with the law in every other 
circuit,
8
 and it is consistent with our own decisions regarding 
mixed questions of law and fact.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that, on 
appeal of denial of a motion to suppress, we review the 
underlying facts for clear error and the application of law to 
the facts de novo).  Likewise, we will review de novo a 
district court’s conclusion that a previously-existing exigency 
has dissipated. 
III. 
 It is undisputed that the officers had probable cause to 
believe that Mallory had committed a crime and that exigent 
                                              
8
 See, e.g., United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 969 
(1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 151 (2d 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Singleton, 441 F.3d 290, 293 (4th 
Cir. 2006); Tamez v. City of San Marcos, Texas, 118 F.3d 
1085, 1094 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 
357, 361 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Howard, 961 F.2d 
1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Schmidt, 403 
F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sarkissian, 
841 F.2d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Stewart, 
867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Franklin, 
694 F.3d 1, 7 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 
153 F.3d 759, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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circumstances justified their warrantless entry into the home 
and subsequent search for him.  We must determine whether, 
after police had located and secured Mallory, an exigency 
remained that justified Officer Hough’s search behind the 
door, which produced the revolver.  The Government argues 
that two exigent circumstances justified the search: first, that 
it was necessary to secure the firearm to protect the safety of 
the officers and to prevent escape, and second, that it was 
necessary to recover the weapon to prevent it from being 
moved and hidden while a warrant was being procured.
9
 
 The Fourth Amendment protects the people from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.  Warrantless searches of the home “are presumptively 
unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause 
and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.”  
Coles, 437 F.3d at 365 (emphasis in original) (citing Steagald 
v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981); Payton, 445 U.S. 
at 586).  We evaluate whether exigent circumstances existed 
by an objective standard; the subjective intent of the officer is 
irrelevant.  Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 
                                              
9
 Equally important as the arguments the Government 
makes are the arguments it does not make.  It does not argue 
that Officer Hough’s search was justified as a search incident 
to a lawful arrest, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969), that the gun was found in the course of a protective 
sweep, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), or that the 
inevitable discovery rule applies, see Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431 (1984).   Instead, it argues only that exigent 
circumstances allowed Officer Hough to search behind the 
door.  Accordingly, we express no opinion on whether Officer 
Hough’s search may have been justified under another 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
 20 
(2006).  The Government bears the burden of demonstrating 
that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search, and 
that burden is “heavy.”  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
749-50 (1984). 
 Exigent circumstances exist when officers are in hot 
pursuit of a fleeing suspect, Coles, 437 F.3d at 366, when 
they “reasonably . . . believe that someone is in imminent 
danger,” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted), or when they 
reasonably believe that they must act “to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence,”  Brigham City, 547 U.S. 
at 403 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) 
(plurality opinion)).  The common thread is imminence – “the 
existence of a true emergency.”  United States v. Simmons, 
661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2011).  “[O]nce the exigencies of 
the initial entry have dissipated, the police must obtain a 
warrant for any further search of the premises.”  United States 
v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978)), abrogated 
on other grounds by Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 
(2014).  
 The Government primarily contends that the search 
was justified by a need to protect officer safety and to prevent 
Mallory’s escape.  In support of this argument, it relies on 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).  In Hayden, police 
entered a home without a warrant after receiving a report that 
a man who had just committed an armed robbery had run into 
the residence.  Id. at 297.  Multiple officers searched the 
basement, first, and second floors of the home, finding 
Hayden feigning sleep in an upstairs bedroom.  Id. at 298.  At 
the same time that Hayden was located, the officers found a 
shotgun and a pistol in the flush tank of a toilet, ammunition 
in a bureau drawer in Hayden’s room, and evidence of the 
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robbery in a washing machine.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
upheld the legality of the officers’ entry into the home and 
their search, explaining that 
The Fourth Amendment does not 
require police officers to delay in 
the course of an investigation if to 
do so would gravely endanger 
their lives or the lives of others. 
Speed here was essential, and 
only a thorough search of the 
house for persons and weapons 
could have insured that Hayden 
was the only man present and that 
the police had control of all 
weapons which could be used 
against them or to effect an 
escape. 
 
Id. at 298-99.  The Court held that “[t]he permissible scope of 
search must . . . be as broad as may reasonably be necessary 
to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house 
may resist or escape.”  Id. at 299. 
 In the Government’s view, Officer Hough’s search 
was legal under Hayden because it occurred as the officers 
escorted Mallory out the door in order to “maintain control of 
Mallory and prevent any access to a weapon by either him or 
anyone who would aid him.”  Gov’t Br. at 18-19.  But critical 
to Hayden’s reasoning was the fact that “the seizures occurred 
prior to or immediately contemporaneous with Hayden’s 
arrest, as part of an effort to find a[n armed] suspected felon.”  
Id. at 299 (emphasis added).  This case differs from Hayden 
because the gun was not found “prior to or contemporaneous 
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with” Mallory’s arrest, but after the premises had been 
secured, Mallory had been located and handcuffed, and as he 
was being led out the front door by multiple officers.  The 
District Court found that Mallory “had already been 
apprehended and handcuffed before Hough began looking for 
the gun,” and that his family members, except for his 
stepmother, were waiting outside the home.  Mallory, 2013 
WL 943407, at *10.  As it recognized, “by the time Officer 
Hough decided to ‘check behind the door,’ he and his partner 
had conducted a thorough sweep of the premises and had 
determined that the house did not contain any confederates 
who might aid Mallory in an escape or acts of aggression.”  
Id. at *11.  The Government does not claim that these factual 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
 Three decisions from other courts of appeals, each 
relied on by the District Court, provide useful guidance for 
our analysis.  In United States v. Ford, officers entered an 
apartment with an arrest warrant for the defendant based on a 
crime committed months earlier.  56 F.3d 265, 267 (D.C. Cir. 
1995).  After handcuffing the defendant, an officer entered a 
bedroom as part of a protective sweep, where he found a .45 
caliber magazine in plain view.  Id.  Notwithstanding the fact 
that there were no people in the bedroom, the officer lifted a 
mattress, under which he found live ammunition, money, and 
crack cocaine, and searched behind the window shades, 
where he found a handgun.  Id.  Allowing that the officer was 
entitled to enter the bedroom as part of a protective sweep, 
the D.C. Circuit concluded that the search under the mattress 
and behind the shades exceeded the scope of the protective 
sweep and rejected the Government’s alternative argument 
(made in reliance on Hayden) that the presence of the 
magazine created a threat to the officers’ safety, justifying a 
further search.  Id. at 271.  The court distinguished Hayden 
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because the crime at issue occurred months rather than 
minutes earlier, and because the search occurred “after, not 
prior to or contemporaneous with Ford’s arrest.”  Id.  
 In United States v. Goree, police responding to a 
domestic violence report entered a home without a warrant.  
365 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  They found a man 
and a woman inside the darkened residence, and handcuffed 
the man after he failed to heed their instructions to put his 
hands in the air.  Id. at 1088.  The officers walked him into 
the dining room so that he could sit down, where they found a 
loaded magazine in plain view on the table.  Id.  One of the 
officers then entered the kitchen to search for a weapon, 
finding a pistol on top of the refrigerator.  Id.  The defendant 
moved to suppress the weapon, which the district court 
denied.  On appeal, the defendant conceded that exigent 
circumstances justified the officers’ entry into the apartment, 
and that their first look into the kitchen was justified as a 
protective sweep under Buie.  Id. at 1090.  He argued only 
that the seizure of the gun “was the product of a second 
warrantless search of the kitchen, unjustified by exigent 
circumstances.”  Id.  On this point, the D.C. Circuit remanded 
for further factual development. 
 The court identified two issues about which it had 
insufficient information to determine whether the need to 
protect officer safety justified the search.  First, it needed 
more information about the extent of the claimed exigency.  
Had the woman in the apartment been moving about freely, or 
had she been secured by an officer?  Id. at 1094.  Was there 
other evidence that she posed a threat?  Id.  Second, the court 
needed to know more about the scope of the intrusion.  How 
far was it from the dining room table where the defendant was 
secured to the refrigerator where the gun was found?  Id.  
Was the path between the two direct or obstructed?  Id.  How 
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well had the defendant been secured, and how easily could he 
have obtained the weapon from the kitchen?  Id. Without 
further evidence on these issues, it was not possible for the 
court to determine whether an exigency justified the 
warrantless search. 
 Finally, we consider the First Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1993).  There, 
officers responded to a report that a shirtless Hispanic male 
wearing camouflage pants had threatened someone with a 
sawed-off shotgun.  Officers arrived and saw Lopez, who 
matched the description, outside.  Id. at 25.  Ignoring the 
officers’ commands to halt, Lopez ran into the building and 
police followed.  Lopez was apprehended and handcuffed in a 
small bedroom, after which police began to search for the 
shotgun.  Id.  One officer entered an adjoining bathroom and 
saw that a ceiling tile was missing. Standing on top of the 
toilet, the officer looked into the ceiling and saw a large bag, 
which turned out to contain cocaine, as well as the butt of the 
shotgun.  Id.  As the officer climbed down off the toilet, the 
ceiling tiles collapsed and the shotgun fell to the floor.  
 Recognizing that the “facts may press close to the 
outer limit of the Fourth Amendment,” the First Circuit 
upheld the legality of the search “[b]y a close margin.”  Id. at 
26-27.  The officers had good reason to believe that a 
dangerous weapon was nearby, and although Lopez himself, 
once handcuffed, did not present a danger, the police “had no 
assurance that Lopez was acting alone . . . or that the 
apartment was secure.”  Id. at 26.  One of the officers testified 
to hearing the footsteps of multiple people in the house, and 
the fact that the building was a “dilapidated, multi-tenant 
structure” made it reasonable to believe that other people in 
the vicinity could obtain and use the shotgun. Id. at 26-27 & 
n.1.  Furthermore, the search was not particularly intrusive.  
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Id. at 27 (observing that “the officer saw the opening in the 
bathroom ceiling through an open door, entered the empty 
room, and with little effort saw the butt of the weapon”).    
 From Hayden, Ford, Goree, and Lopez we can discern 
factors that will be useful for determining whether the search 
in this case was justified by a reasonable belief that it was 
necessary to protect officer safety.  These factors may 
include, but are not limited to: how soon after the alleged 
offense the search occurred; whether the alleged offense was 
violent in nature; whether the search occurred prior to or 
contemporaneous with Mallory’s apprehension; whether the 
premises as a whole had been secured, or whether it was 
possible that unknown individuals remained in the house; 
whether Mallory or any of his family members had acted in 
an aggressive or threatening manner toward the police; 
whether other members of the family were free to move about 
the house unsupervised by an officer; how easily Mallory or a 
family member could have obtained and used the firearm; and 
the degree of intrusiveness of the search.  In light of these 
considerations, we agree with the District Court that any 
exigency justifying a warrantless search had dissipated by the 
time Officer Hough recovered the gun, and therefore 
suppression was warranted. 
 By the time Officer Hough searched behind the door 
and under an umbrella to find the gun, the police had secured 
Mallory, the family, and the home, and were in control of the 
situation.  Mallory was in handcuffs and was being escorted 
out of the house by multiple officers.  Cf. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 
299 (conditioning the scope of a search to be “as broad as 
may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the 
suspect at large in the house may resist or escape” (emphasis 
added)).  Although he had earlier fled arrest, there is no 
indication that Mallory resisted either physically or orally 
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once he was located in the bathroom.  See Simmons, 661 F.3d 
at 157-58 (concluding that exigent circumstances to search 
for a firearm were absent when the suspect was “very 
cooperative and non-combative,” and the premises was “full 
of cops” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The house had 
been thoroughly swept and there were no persons left 
unaccounted for who might attack the officers by surprise.  
Cf. Lopez, 989 F.2d at 26-27 (finding that “police had no 
assurance . . . that the apartment was secure”).  There is no 
evidence that Mallory’s family members posed a threat to the 
officers, or that they even knew the location of the gun.  Each 
of the family members save Delaine was outside on the porch, 
and Delaine, far from being threatening, had actually 
attempted to assist the officers in apprehending Mallory 
without violence by urging him to come out of the locked 
bathroom. The Government makes the generalized assertion 
that “police had not recovered the gun they saw in Mallory’s 
possession, and the family members were hostile to the police 
action,” Gov’t Br. at 31, but that hostility consisted primarily 
of two family members briefly protesting the warrantless 
entry of their home in the middle of the night.  See United 
States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing “that a nighttime search is particularly 
intrusive”).  There is no evidence that this brief hostility 
continued, and the family was under police supervision. 
 The Government makes much of the fact that the gun 
lay in the path that the officers took in escorting Mallory out 
of the house, a fact of which Mallory was aware but the 
police were not, and that Mallory could have “lunge[d] for the 
hidden and very nearby gun.”  Gov’t Br. at 28-29.  This 
argument has some merit.  But nonetheless, Mallory was 
handcuffed and under the control of multiple officers and he 
had not – since coming under the officers’ control – acted 
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violently or aggressively. Likewise, we recognize that 
Mallory’s alleged crime had taken place only minutes earlier 
and that the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm, while 
not itself a crime of violence, could certainly lead the officers 
to reasonably be concerned that their suspect could be 
dangerous.  However, the officers’ securing of the premises 
and apprehension of Mallory were intervening events allaying 
any imminent need to locate the gun.   
 The Government also argues that the search was 
justified by a need to prevent the gun from being moved and 
hidden, in order to preserve evidence of the crime.  The 
exigent circumstances doctrine allows the police to engage in 
a warrantless search in order to prevent “the ‘imminent 
destruction of evidence.’”  United States v. King, 604 F.3d 
125, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Couden, 446 F.3d at 496).  
We reject this argument for many of the same reasons that we 
reject the Government’s prior argument.  The Government 
presented no evidence that there was an imminent risk that a 
family member would move the gun.  As we noted above, 
there is no evidence that the family members even knew 
where it was.  In fact, the evidence of record suggests that 
every family member but Delaine was under supervision 
outside the house, and Delaine had demonstrated her 
compliance by cooperating with the officers.  As the District 
Court noted, once Mallory was secured “speed was not 
essential . . . and anyone else who could have destroyed or 
hidden the gun was under police supervision.”  Mallory, 2013 
WL 943407, at *11.  At that point, nothing prevented the 
officers from continuing to control the residence and prevent 
the family from finding and moving the gun until they could 
obtain a search warrant.  See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 
326, 331-32 (2001) (allowing police to prevent a man whom 
they had probable cause to believe had hidden marijuana in 
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his trailer, and which he would likely destroy if permitted, 
from reentering his home for two hours while they obtained a 
search warrant). 
IV. 
 If Lopez “press[ed] close to the outer limit of the 
Fourth Amendment,” 989 F.2d at 27, then this case falls just 
outside it.  We do not mean to underplay the dangers that 
police officers may face when pursuing a suspect into an 
unfamiliar building.  Nonetheless, once the officers had 
secured the premises and apprehended Mallory, the 
exigencies of the moment abated and the warrant requirement 
reattached.  We therefore affirm the order of the District 
Court granting Mallory’s motion to suppress. 
